Science Advances
Supplementary Materials
This PDF file includes:
- section S1. Background on models of decision-making
- section S2. Study system
- section S3. Skewness of DSP
- section S4. Dimensionality and initial conditions
- section S5. Analogous model of neural decision-making
- section S6. Derivation of partial differential equations for decision time, error
rate, and probability of reaching decision preference
- section S7. Nash equilibria
- section S8. A notion of correctness for biological computation
- section S9. Calculation of mutual information
- section S10. Most informative measures of consensus
- section S11. Tuning waiting costs
- section S12. Comparison of our model to previous studies of animal conflict
- section S13. War of attrition
- section S14. Supplementary table
- section S15. Supplementary figures
- table S1. Examples of collective computation.
- fig. S1. Error rate decreases as decision time increases, as long as the initial
conditions are not biased toward the correct decision.
- fig. S2. The mutual information of the power scores computed by a group using
Nash thresholds increases as the weight given to decision preference increases, as
long as there are nonzero waiting costs.
- fig. S3. The average skewness of the distribution of eigenvector centrality is
maximized at intermediate waiting costs.
- fig. S4. The best measure of consensus in the decision network depends on the
average error rate and the types of errors being made.
- fig. S5. Schematic of the model.
- fig. S6. The error rate of a group using Nash thresholds decreases as the weight
given to decision preference increases, regardless of the size of the group.
- fig. S7. Pairs with similar and high abilities always take as long or longer to make
a decision than any other pairs do.
- fig. S8. The mutual information of each consensus algorithm is a decreasing
function of the average pairwise error rate.
- fig. S9. The average skewness of the distribution of unweighted in-degree is
maximized at intermediate waiting costs.
- fig. S10. The average skewness of the distribution of consensus scores from each
measure is maximized at intermediate waiting costs.
- fig. S11. The average skewness of the distribution of consensus scores from each
measure is maximized at intermediate waiting costs.
- fig. S12. When a pair of animals have equal fighting abilities, c = 0.5, there are asymmetric Nash equilibrium thresholds.
- References (55–59)
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