Science Advances

Supplementary Materials

This PDF file includes:

  • Theoretical motivation
  • Experimental instructions and computer interface
  • Statistical methods
  • Extended results
  • Additional results
  • Individual group outcomes
  • Fig. S1. Best response function.
  • Fig. S2. First instruction page.
  • Fig. S3. Second instruction page.
  • Fig. S4. Third instruction page.
  • Fig. S5. Examples page.
  • Fig. S6. Examples page (continued).
  • Fig. S7. Payment explanation.
  • Fig. S8. Comprehension questions.
  • Fig. S9. Comprehension questions (continued).
  • Fig. S10. Comprehension questions (continued).
  • Fig. S11. Threshold announcement at the start of an experimental block.
  • Fig. S12. Contribution stage.
  • Fig. S13. Contribution feedback.
  • Fig. S14. Block feedback.
  • Fig. S15. Punishment stage.
  • Fig. S16. Punishment feedback.
  • Fig. S17. Group dynamics.
  • Fig. S18. Collective and individual action.
  • Fig. S19. Strategy shifts across cost-benefit ratio.
  • Fig. S20. Average received punishment.
  • Fig. S21. Average dealt punishment.
  • Fig. S22. Average change in earnings.
  • Fig. S23. Cumulative contributions across time.
  • Fig. S24. Inequality in earnings.
  • Fig. S25. First round behavior predicting group outcome.
  • Fig. S26. Baseline condition, ci = 40.
  • Fig. S27. Baseline condition, ci = 50.
  • Fig. S28. Baseline condition, ci = 60.
  • Fig. S29. Baseline condition, ci = 70.
  • Fig. S30. Baseline condition, ci = 80.
  • Fig. S31. Punishment condition, ci = 40.
  • Fig. S32. Punishment condition, ci = 50.
  • Fig. S33. Punishment condition, ci = 60.
  • Fig. S34. Punishment condition, ci = 70.
  • Fig. S35. Punishment condition, ci = 80.
  • Table S1. Individual action.
  • Table S2. Collective action.
  • Table S3. Earnings.
  • Table S4. Group-level transitions of strategies.
  • Table S5. Within-subject transitions of strategies.
  • Table S6. Collective action under peer punishment.
  • Table S7. Free riding under peer punishment.
  • Table S8. Received punishment.
  • Table S9. Dealt punishment.
  • Table S10. Dealt punishment by altruists and individualists.
  • Table S11. Earnings across baseline and punishment.
  • Table S12. Earnings inequality across baseline and punishment.
  • Table S13. Public pool contributions based on past round behavior.
  • Table S14. Individual pool contributions based on past round behavior.
  • References (3348)

Download PDF

Files in this Data Supplement: